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ABSTRACT
We explore methods of producing adversarial examples on deep generative mod-
els such as the variational autoencoder (VAE) and the VAE-GAN. Deep learning
architectures are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples, but previous
work has focused on the application of adversarial examples to classification tasks.
Deep generative models have recently become popular due to their ability to model
input data distributions and generate realistic examples from those distributions.
We present three classes of attacks on the VAE and VAE-GAN architectures and
demonstrate them against networks trained on MNIST, SVHN and CelebA. Our
first attack leverages classification-based adversaries by attaching a classifier to
the trained encoder of the target generative model, which can then be used to in-
directly manipulate the latent representation. Our second attack directly uses the
VAE loss function to generate a target reconstruction image from the adversarial
example. Our third attack moves beyond relying on classification or the standard
loss for the gradient and directly optimizes against differences in source and tar-
get latent representations. We also motivate why an attacker might be interested
in deploying such techniques against a target generative network.
1 INTRODUCTION
Adversarial examples have been shown to exist for a variety of deep learning architectures.1 They
are small perturbations of the original inputs, often barely visible to a human observer, but carefully
crafted to misguide the network into producing incorrect outputs. Seminal work by Szegedy et al.
(2013) and Goodfellow et al. (2014), as well as much recent work, has shown that adversarial
examples are abundant and finding them is easy.
Most previous work focuses on the application of adversarial examples to the task of classification,
where the deep network assigns classes to input images. The attack adds small adversarial perturba-
tions to the original input image. These perturbations cause the network to change its classification
of the input, from the correct class to some other incorrect class (possibly chosen by the attacker).
Critically, the perturbed input must still be recognizable to a human observer as belonging to the
original input class.2
Deep generative models, such as Kingma & Welling (2013), learn to generate a variety of outputs,
ranging from handwritten digits to faces (Kulkarni et al., 2015), realistic scenes (Oord et al., 2016),
videos (Kalchbrenner et al., 2016), 3D objects (Dosovitskiy et al., 2016), and audio (van den Oord
et al., 2016). These models learn an approximation of the input data distribution in different ways,
and then sample from this distribution to generate previously unseen but plausible outputs.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has explored using adversarial inputs to attack gen-
erative models. There are two main requirements for such work: describing a plausible scenario
in which an attacker might want to attack a generative model; and designing and demonstrating an
attack that succeeds against generative models. We address both of these requirements in this work.
One of the most basic applications of generative models is input reconstruction. Given an input im-
age, the model first encodes it into a lower-dimensional latent representation, and then uses that rep-
resentation to generate a reconstruction of the original input image. Since the latent representation
1 Adversarial examples are even easier to produce against most other machine learning architectures, as
shown in Papernot et al. (2016), but we are focused on deep networks.
2 Random noise images and “fooling” images (Nguyen et al., 2014) do not belong to this strict definition of
an adversarial input, although they do highlight other limitations of current classifiers.
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usually has much fewer dimensions than the original input, it can be used as a form of compression.
The latent representation can also be used to remove some types of noise from inputs, even when the
network has not been explicitly trained for denoising, due to the lower dimensionality of the latent
representation restricting what information the trained network is able to represent. Many genera-
tive models also allow manipulation of the generated output by sampling different latent values or
modifying individual dimensions of the latent vectors without needing to pass through the encoding
step.
These properties of input reconstruction generative networks suggest a variety of different attacks
that would be enabled by effective adversaries against generative networks. Any attack that targets
the compression bottleneck of the latent representation can exploit natural security vulnerabilities in
applications built to use that latent representation. Specifically, if the person doing the encoding step
is separated from the person doing the decoding step, the attacker may be able to cause the encoding
party to believe they have encoded a particular message for the decoding party, but in reality they
have encoded a different message of the attacker’s choosing. We explore this idea in more detail as
it applies to the application of compressing images using a VAE or VAE-GAN architecture.
2 RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
This work focuses on adversaries for variational autoencoders (VAEs, proposed in Kingma &
Welling (2013)) and VAE-GANs (VAEs composed with a generative adversarial network, proposed
in Larsen et al. (2015)).
2.1 RELATED WORK ON ADVERSARIES
Many adversarial attacks on classification models have been described in existing literature (Good-
fellow et al., 2014; Szegedy et al., 2013). These attacks can be untargeted, where the adversary’s
goal is to cause any misclassification, or the least likely misclassification (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Kurakin et al., 2016); or they can be targeted, where the attacker desires a specific misclassification.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) gives a recent example of a strong targeted adversarial attack. Some
adversarial attacks allow for a threat model where the adversary does not have access to the target
model (Szegedy et al., 2013; Papernot et al., 2016), but commonly it is assumed that the attacker
does have that access, in an online or offline setting (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016).3
Given a classifier f(x) : x ∈ X → y ∈ Y and original inputs x ∈ X , the problem
of generating untargeted adversarial examples can be expressed as the following optimization:
argminx∗ L(x,x
∗) s.t. f(x∗) 6= f(x), where L(·) is a chosen distance measure between exam-
ples from the input space (e.g., the L2 norm). Similarly, generating a targeted adversarial attack on
a classifier can be expressed as argminx∗ L(x,x
∗) s.t. f(x∗) = yt, where yt ∈ Y is some target
label chosen by the attacker.
These optimization problems can often be solved with optimizers like L-BFGS or Adam (Kingma
& Ba, 2015), as done in Szegedy et al. (2013) and Carlini & Wagner (2016). They can also be
approximated with single-step gradient-based techniques like fast gradient sign (Goodfellow et al.,
2014), fast gradient L2 (Huang et al., 2015), or fast least likely class (Kurakin et al., 2016); or they
can be approximated with iterative variants of those and other gradient-based techniques (Kurakin
et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016).
An interesting variation of this type of attack can be found in Sabour et al. (2015). In that work,
they attack the hidden state of the target network directly by taking an input image x and a target
image xt and searching for a perturbed variant of x that generates similar hidden state at layer l of
the target network to the hidden state at the same layer generated by xt. This approach can also be
applied directly to attacking the latent vector of a generative model.
A variant of this attack has also been applied to VAE models in the concurrent work of Tabacof
et al. (2016)4, which uses the KL divergence between the latent representation of the source and
target images to generate the adversarial example. However in their paper, the authors mention that
they tried attacking the output directly and that this only managed to make the reconstructions more
3 See Papernot et al. (2015) for an overview of different adversarial threat models.
4 This work was made public shortly after we published our early drafts.
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Figure 1: Depiction of the attack scenario. The VAE is used as a compression scheme to transmit
a latent representation of the image from the sender (left) to the receiver (right). The attacker con-
vinces the sender to compress a particular image into its latent vector, which is sent to the receiver,
where the decoder reconstructs the latent vector into some other image chosen by the attacker.
blurry. While they do not explain the exact experimental setting, the attack sounds similar to our
LVAE attack, which we find very successful. Also, in their paper the authors do not consider the
more advanced VAE-GAN models and more complex datasets like CelebA.
2.2 BACKGROUND ON VAES AND VAE-GANS
The general architecture of a variational autoencoder consists of three components, as shown in Fig-
ure 8. The encoder fenc(x) is a neural network mapping a high-dimensional input representation
x into a lower-dimensional (compressed) latent representation z. All possible values of z form a
latent space. Similar values in the latent space should produce similar outputs from the decoder in
a well-trained VAE. And finally, the decoder/generator fdec(z), which is a neural network map-
ping the compressed latent representation back to a high-dimensional output xˆ. Composing these
networks allows basic input reconstruction xˆ = fdec(fenc(x)). This composed architecture is used
during training to backpropagate errors from the loss function.
The variational autoencoder’s loss functionLVAE enables the network to learn a latent representation
that approximates the intractable posterior distribution p(z|x):
LVAE = −DKL[q(z|x)||p(z)] + Eq[log p(x|z)]. (1)
q(z|x) is the learned approximation of the posterior distribution p(z|x). p(z) is the prior distribution
of the latent representation z. DKL denotes the Kullback–Leibler divergence. Eq[log p(x|z)] is
the variational lower bound, which in the case of input reconstruction is the cross-entropy H[x, xˆ]
between the inputs x and their reconstructions xˆ. In order to generate xˆ the VAE needs to sample
q(z|x) and then compute fdec(z).
For the VAE to be fully differentiable while sampling from q(z|x), the reparametrization trick
(Kingma & Welling, 2013) extracts the random sampling step from the network and turns it into
an input, ε. VAEs are often parameterized with Gaussian distributions. In this case, fenc(x) outputs
the distribution parametersµ andσ2. That distribution is then sampled by computing z = µ+ε
√
σ2
where ε ∼ N(0, 1) is the input random sample, which does not depend on any parameters of fenc,
and thus does not impact differentiation of the network.
The VAE-GAN architecture of Larsen et al. (2015) has the same fenc and fdec pair as in the VAE.
It also adds a discriminator fdisc that is used during training, as in standard generative adversarial
networks (Goodfellow et al., 2014). The loss function of fdec uses the disciminator loss instead of
cross-entropy for estimating the reconstruction error.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
We provide a motivating attack scenario for adversaries against generative models, as well as a
formal definition of an adversary in the generative setting.
3.1 MOTIVATING ATTACK SCENARIO
To motivate the attacks presented below, we describe the attack scenario depicted in Figure 1. In
this scenario, there are two parties, the sender and the receiver, who wish to share images with each
other over a computer network. In order to conserve bandwidth, they share a VAE trained on the
input distribution of interest, which will allow them to send only latent vectors z.
3
Figure 2: Results for the L2 optimization latent attack (see Section 4.3) on the VAE-GAN, targeting
a specific image from the class 0. Shown are the first 12 non-zero images from the test SVHN data
set. The columns are, in order: the original image, the reconstruction of the original image, the
adversarial example, the predicted class of the adversarial example, the reconstruction of the adver-
sarial example, the predicted class of the reconstructed adversarial example, the reconstruction of the
reconstructed adversarial example (see Section 4.5), and the predicted class of that reconstruction.
The attacker’s goal is to convince the sender to send an image of the attacker’s choosing to the
receiver, but the attacker has no direct control over the bytes sent between the two parties. However,
the attacker has a copy of the shared VAE. The attacker presents an image x∗ to the sender which
resembles an image x that the sender wants to share with the receiver. For example, the sender
wants to share pictures of kittens with the receiver, so the attacker presents a web page to the sender
with a picture of a kitten, which is x∗. The sender chooses x∗ and sends its corresponding z to the
receiver, who reconstructs it. However, because the attacker controlled the chosen image, when the
receiver reconstructs it, instead of getting a faithful reproduction xˆ of x (e.g., a kitten), the receiver
sees some other image of the attacker’s choosing, xˆadv, which has a different meaning from x (e.g.,
a request to send money to the attacker’s bank account).
There are other attacks of this general form, where the sender and the receiver may be separated
by distance, as in this example, or by time, in the case of storing compressed images to disk for
later retrieval. In the time-separated attack, the sender and the receiver may be the same person or
multiple different people. In either case, if they are using the insecure channel of the VAE’s latent
space, the messages they share may be under the control of an attacker. For example, an attacker
may be able to fool an automatic surveillance system if the system uses this type of compression to
store the video signal before it is processed by other systems. In this case, the subsequent analysis
of the video signal could be on compromised data showing what the attacker wants to show.
While we do not specifically attack their models, viable compression schemes based on deep neural
networks have already been proposed in the literature, showing promising results Toderici et al.
(2015; 2016).
3.2 DEFINING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES AGAINST GENERATIVE MODELS
We make the following assumptions about generating adversarial examples on a target generative
model, Gtarg(x) = fdec(fenc(x)). Gtarg is trained on inputs X that can naturally be labeled with
semantically meaningful classes Y , although there may be no such labels at training time, or the
labels may not have been used during training. Gtarg normally succeeds at generating an output
xˆ = Gtarg(x) in class y when presented with an input x from class y. In other words, whatever
target output class the attacker is interested in, we assume that Gtarg successfully captures it in the
latent representation such that it can generate examples of that class from the decoder. This target
output class does not need to be from the most salient classes in the training dataset. For example, on
models trained on MNIST, the attacker may not care about generating different target digits (which
are the most salient classes). The attacker may prefer to generate the same input digits in a different
style (perhaps to aid forgery). We also assume that the attacker has access to Gtarg. Finally, the
attacker has access to a set of examples from the same distribution as X that have the target label
4
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Figure 3: The VAE-GAN classifier architecture used to generate classifier-based adversarial exam-
ples on the VAE-GAN. The VAE-GAN in the dashed box is the target network and is frozen while
training the classifier. The path x → fenc → z → fclass → yˆ is used to generate adversarial
examples in z, which can then be reconstructed by fdec.
yt the attacker wants to generate. This does not mean that the attacker needs access to the labeled
training dataset (which may not exist), or to an appropriate labeled dataset with large numbers of
examples labeled for each class y ∈ Y (which may be hard or expensive to collect). The attacks
described here may be successful with only a small amount of data labeled for a single target class
of interest.
One way to generate such adversaries is by solving the optimization problem
argminx∗ L(x,x
∗) s.t. ORACLE(Gtarg(x∗)) = yt, where ORACLE reliably discriminates
between inputs of class yt and inputs of other classes. In practice, a classifier trained by the
attacker may server as ORACLE. Other types of adversaries from Section 2.1 can also be used to
approximate this optimization in natural ways, some of which we describe in Section 4.
If the attacker only needs to generate one successful attack, the problem of determining if an attack
is successful can be solved by manually reviewing the x∗ and xˆadv pairs and choosing whichever
the attacker considers best. However, if the attacker wants to generate many successful attacks, an
automated method of evaluating the success of an attack is necessary. We show in Section 4.5 how
to measure the effectiveness of an attack automatically using a classifier trained on z = fenc(x).
4 ATTACK METHODOLOGY
The attacker would like to construct an adversarially-perturbed input to influence the latent repre-
sentation in a way that will cause the reconstruction process to reconstruct an output for a different
class. We propose three approaches to attacking generative models: a classifier-based attack, where
we train a new classifier on top of the latent space z and use that classifier to find adversarial exam-
ples in the latent space; an attack using LVAE to target the output directly; and an attack on the latent
space, z. All three methods are technically applicable to any generative architecture that relies on a
learned latent representation z. Without loss of generality, we focus on the VAE-GAN architecture.
4.1 CLASSIFIER ATTACK
By adding a classifier fclass to the pre-trained generative model5, we can turn the problem of gen-
erating adversaries for generative models back into the previously solved problem of generating
adversarial examples for classifiers. This approach allows us to apply all of the existing attacks
on classifiers in the literature. However, as discussed below, using this classifier tends to produce
lower-quality reconstructions from the adversarial examples than the other two attacks due to the
inaccuracies of the classifier.
Step 1. The weights of the target generative model are frozen, and a new classifier fclass(z)→ yˆ is
trained on top of fenc using a standard classification loss Lclassifier such as cross-entropy, as shown
in Figure 3. This process is independent of how the original model is trained, but it requires a
5 This is similar to the process of semi-supervised learning in Kingma et al. (2014), although the goal is
different.
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training corpus pulled from approximately the same input distribution as was used to train Gtarg,
with ground truth labels for at least two classes: yt and yt˜, the negative class.
Step 2. With the trained classifier, the attacker finds adversarial examples x∗ using the methods
described in Section 4.4.
Using fclass to generate adversarial examples does not always result in high-quality reconstructions,
as can be seen in the middle column of Figure 5 and in Figure 11. This appears to be due to
the fact that fclass adds additional noise to the process. For example, fclass sometimes confidently
misclassifies latent vectors z that represent inputs that are far from the training data distribution,
resulting in fdec failing to reconstruct a plausible output from the adversarial example.
4.2 LVAE ATTACK
Our second approach generates adversarial perturbations using the VAE loss function. The attacker
chooses two inputs, xs (the source) and xt (the target), and uses one of the standard adversarial
methods to perturb xs into x∗ such that its reconstruction xˆ∗ matches the reconstruction of xt, using
the methods described in Section 4.4.
The adversary precomputes the reconstruction xˆt by evaluating fdec(fenc(xt)) once before per-
forming optimization. In order to use LVAE in an attack, the second term (the reconstruction loss)
of LVAE (see Equation 1) is changed so that instead of computing the reconstruction loss between x
and xˆ, the loss is computed between xˆ∗ and xˆt. This means that during each optimization iteration,
the adversary needs to compute xˆ∗, which requires the full fdec(fenc(x∗)) to be evaluated.
4.3 LATENT ATTACK
Our third approach attacks the latent space of the generative model.
Single latent vector target. This attack is similar to the work of Sabour et al. (2015), in which
they use a pair of source image xs and target image xt to generate x∗ that induces the target network
to produce similar activations at some hidden layer l as are produced by xt, while maintaining
similarity between xs and x∗.
For this attack to work on latent generative models, it is sufficient to compute zt = fenc(xt) and
then use the following loss function to generate adversarial examples from different source images
xs, using the methods described in Section 4.4:
Llatent = L(zt, fenc(x∗)). (2)
L(·) is a distance measure between two vectors. We use the L2 norm, under the assumption that the
latent space is approximately euclidean.
We also explored a variation on the single latent vector target attack, which we describe in Sec-
tion A.1 in the Appendix.
4.4 METHODS FOR SOLVING THE ADVERSARIAL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
We can use a number of different methods to generate the adversarial examples. We initially evalu-
ated both the fast gradient sign Goodfellow et al. (2014) method and an L2 optimization method. As
the latter produces much better results we focus on the L2 optimization method, while we include
some FGS results in the Appendix. The attack can be used either in targeted mode (where we want
a specific class, yt, to be reconstructed) or untargeted mode (where we just want an incorrect class
to be reconstructed). In this paper, we focus on the targeted mode of the attacks.
L2 optimization. The optimization-based approach, explored in Szegedy et al. (2013) and Carlini
& Wagner (2016), poses the adversarial generation problem as the following optimization problem:
argminx∗ λL(x,x
∗) + L(x∗, yt). (3)
As above, L(·) is a distance measure, and L is one of Lclassifier, LVAE, or Llatent. The constant
λ is used to balance the two loss contributions. For the LVAE attack, the optimizer must do a full
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reconstruction at each step of the optimizer. The other two attacks do not need to do reconstructions
while the optimizer is running, so they generate adversarial examples much more quickly, as shown
in Table 1.
4.5 MEASURING ATTACK EFFECTIVENESS
To generate a large number of adversarial examples automatically against a generative model, the
attacker needs a way to judge the quality of the adversarial examples. We leverage fclass to estimate
whether a particular attack was successful.6
Reconstruction feedback loop. The architecture is the same as shown in Figure 3. We use the
generative model to reconstruct the attempted adversarial inputs x∗ by computing:
xˆ∗ = fdec(fenc(x∗)). (4)
Then, fclass is used to compute:
yˆ = fclass(fenc(xˆ
∗)). (5)
The input adversarial examples x∗ are not classified directly, but are first fed to the generative model
for reconstruction. This reconstruction loop improves the accuracy of the classifier by 60% on av-
erage against the adversarial attacks we examined. The predicted label yˆ after the reconstruction
feedback loop is compared with the attack target yt to determine if the adversarial example success-
fully reconstructed to the target class. If the precision and recall of fclass are sufficiently high on
yt, fclass can be used to filter out most of the failed adversarial examples while keeping most of the
good ones.
We derive two metrics from classifier predictions after one reconstruction feedback loop. The first
metric is ASignore−target, the attack success rate ignoring targeting, i.e., without requiring the out-
put class of the adversarial example to match the target class:
ASignore−target =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1yˆi 6=yi (6)
N is the total number of reconstructed adversarial examples; 1yˆi 6=yi is 1 when yˆi, the classification
of the reconstruction for image i, does not equal yi, the ground truth classification of the original
image, and 0 otherwise. The second metric is AStarget, the attack success rate including targeting
(i.e., requiring the output class of the adversarial example to match the target class), which we define
similarly as:
AStarget =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1yˆi=yit . (7)
Both metrics are expected to be higher for more successful attacks. Note that AStarget ≤
ASignore−target. When computing these metrics, we exclude input examples that have the same
ground truth class as the target class.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate the three attacks on MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998), SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011) and
CelebA (Liu et al., 2015), using the standard training and validation set splits. The VAE and VAE-
GAN architectures are implemented in TensorFlow (Abadi & et al., 2015). We optimized using
Adam with learning rate 0.001 and other parameters set to default values for both the generative
model and the classifier. For the VAE, we use two architectures: a simple architecture with a single
fully-connected hidden layer with 512 units and ReLU activation function; and a convolutional ar-
chitecture taken from the original VAE-GAN paper Larsen et al. (2015) (but trained with only the
VAE loss). We use the same architecture trained with the additional GAN loss for the VAE-GAN
model, as described in that work. For both VAE and VAE-GAN we use a 50-dimensional latent rep-
resentation on MNIST, a 1024-dimensional latent representation on SVHN and 2048-dimensional
latent representation on CelebA.
6 Note that fclass here is being used in a different manner than when we use it to generate adversarial
examples. However, the network itself is identical, so we don’t distinguish between the two uses in the notation.
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Figure 4: Results for the L2 optimization latent attack on the VAE-GAN, targeting the mean latent
vector for 0. Shown are the first 12 non-zero images from the test MNIST data set. The columns
are, in order: the original image, the reconstruction of the original image, the adversarial example,
the predicted class of the adversarial example, the reconstruction of the adversarial example, the
predicted class of the reconstructed adversarial example, the reconstruction of the reconstructed
adversarial example (see Section 4.5), and the predicted class of that reconstruction.
In this section we only show results where no sampling from latent space has been performed.
Instead we use the mean vector µ as the latent representation z. As sampling can have an effect on
the resulting reconstructions, we evaluated it separately. We show the results with different number
of samples in Figure 22 in the Appendix. On most examples, the visible change is small and in
general the attack is still successful.
5.1 MNIST
Both VAE and VAE-GAN by themselves reconstruct the original inputs well as show in Figure 9,
although the quality from the VAE-GAN is noticeably better. As a control, we also generate random
noise of the same magnitude as used for the adversarial examples (see Figure 13), to show that ran-
dom noise does not cause the reconstructed noisy images to change in any significant way. Although
we ran experiments on both VAEs and VAE-GANs, we only show results for the VAE-GAN as it
generates much higher quality reconstructions than the corresponding VAE.
5.1.1 CLASSIFIER ATTACK
We use a simple classifier architecture to help generate attacks on the VAE and VAE-GAN models.
The classifier consists of two fully-connected hidden layers with 512 units each, using the ReLU
activation function. The output layer is a 10 dimensional softmax. The input to the classifier is
the 50 dimensional latent representation produced by the VAE/VAE-GAN encoder. The classifier
achieves 98.05% accuracy on the validation set after training for 100 epochs.
To see if there are differences between classes, we generate targeted adversarial examples for each
MNIST class and present the results per-class. For the targeted attacks we used the optimization
method with lambda 0.001, where Adam-based optimization was performed for 1000 epochs with
a learning rate of 0.1. The mean L2 norm of the difference between original images and generated
adversarial examples using the classifier attack is 3.36, while the mean RMSD is 0.120.
Numerical results in Table 2 show that the targeted classifier attack successfully fools the classifier.
Classifier accuracy is reduced to 0%, while the matching rate (the ratio between the number of
predictions matching the target class and the number of incorrectly classified images) is 100%, which
means that all incorrect predictions match the target class. However, what we are interested in (as
per the attack definition from Section 3.2) is how the generative model reconstructs the adversarial
examples. If we look at the images generated by the VAE-GAN for class 0, shown in Figure 4, the
targeted attack is successful on some reconstructed images (e.g. one, four, five, six and nine are
reconstructed as zeroes). But even when the classifier accuracy is 0% and matching rate is 100%,
an incorrect classification does not always result in a reconstruction to the target class, which shows
that the classifier is fooled by an adversarial example more easily than the generative model.
Reconstruction feedback loop. The reconstruction feedback loop described in Section 4.5 can
be used to measure how well a targeted attack succeeds in making the generative model change the
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Figure 5: Left: representative adversarial examples with a target class of 0 on the first 100 non-
zero images from the MNIST validation set. These were produced using the L2 optimization latent
attack (Section 4.3). Middle: VAE-GAN reconstructions from adversarial examples produced using
the L2 optimization classifier attack on the same set of 100 validation images (those adversaries
are not shown, but are qualitatively similiar, see Section 4.1). Right: VAE-GAN reconstructions
from the adversarial examples in the left column. Many of the classifier adversarial examples fail to
reconstruct as zeros, whereas almost every adversarial example from the latent attack reconstructs
as zero.
reconstructed classes. Table 4 in the Appendix shows ASignore−target and AStarget for all source
and target class pairs. A higher value signifies a more successful attack for that pair of classes. It
is interesting to observe that attacking some source/target pairs is much easier than others (e.g. pair
(4, 0) vs. (0, 8)) and that the results are not symmetric over source/target pairs. Also, some pairs do
well in ASignore−target, but do poorly in AStarget (e.g., all source digits when targeting 4). As can
be seen in Figure 11, the classifier adversarial examples targeting 4 consistently fail to reconstruct
into something easily recognizable as a 4. Most of the reconstructions look like 5, but the adversarial
example reconstructions of source 5s instead look like 0 or 3.
5.1.2 LVAE ATTACK
For generating adversarial examples using the LVAE attack, we used the optimization method with
λ = 1.0, where Adam-based optimization was performed for 1000 epochs with a learning rate of 0.1.
The mean L2 norm of the difference between original images and generated adversarial examples
with this approach is 3.68, while the mean RMSD is 0.131.
We show ASignore−target and AStarget of the LVAE attack in Table 5 in the Appendix. Comparing
with the numerical evaluation results of the latent attack (below), we can see that both methods
achieve similar results on MNIST.
5.1.3 LATENT ATTACK
To generate adversarial examples using the latent attack, we used the optimization method with
λ = 1.0, where Adam-based optimization was performed for 1000 epochs with a learning rate
of 0.1. The mean L2 norm of the difference between original images and generated adversarial
examples using this approach is 2.96, while the mean RMSD is 0.105.
Table 3 shows ASignore−target and AStarget for all source and target class pairs. Comparing with
the numerical evaluation results of the classifier attack we can see that the latent attack performs
much better. This result remains true when visually comparing the reconstructed images, shown in
Figure 5.
We also tried an untargeted version of the latent attack, where we change Equation 2 to maximize
the distance in latent space between the encoding of the original image and the encoding of the
adversarial example. In this case the loss we are trying to minimize is unbounded, since the L2
distance can always grow larger, so the attack normally fails to generate a reasonable adversarial
example.
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Figure 6: Left: VAE-GAN reconstructions of adversarial examples generated using the L2 optimiza-
tion LVAE attack (single image target). Right: VAE-GAN reconstructions of adversarial examples
generated using the L2 optimization latent attack (single image target). Approximately 85 out of
100 images are convincing zeros for the L2 latent attack, whereas only about 5 out of 100 could be
mistaken for zeros with the LVAE attack.
Additionally, we also experimented with targeting latent representations of specific images from the
training set instead of taking the mean, as described in Section 4.3. We show the numerical results
in Table 3 and the generated reconstructions in Figure 15 (in the Appendix). It is also interesting
to compare the results with LVAE, by choosing the same image as the target. Results for LVAE for
the same target images as in Table 3 are shown in Table 6 in the Appendix. The results are identical
between the two attacks, which is expected as the target image is the same – only the loss function
differs between the methods.
5.2 SVHN
The SVHN dataset consists of cropped street number images and is much less clean than MNIST.
Due to the way the images have been processed, each image may contain more than one digit; the
target digit is roughly in the center. VAE-GAN produces high-quality reconstructions of the original
images as shown in Figure 17 in the Appendix.
For the classifier attack, we set λ = 10−5 after testing a range of values, although we were unable to
find an effective value for this attack against SVHN. For the latent and LVAE attacks we set λ = 10.
In Table 10 we show ASignore−target and AStarget for the L2 optimization latent attack. The eval-
uation metrics are less strong on SVHN than on MNIST, but it is still straightforward for an attacker
to find a successful attack for almost all source/target pairs. Figure 2 supports this evaluation. Visual
inspection shows that 11 out of the 12 adversarial examples reconstructed as 0, the target digit. It
is worth noting that 2 out of the 12 adversarial examples look like zeros (rows 1 and 11), and two
others look like both the original digit and zero, depending on whether the viewer focuses on the
light or dark areas of the image (rows 4 and 7). The L2 optimization latent attack achieves much
better results than the LVAE attack (see Table 11 and Figure 6) on SVHN, while both attacks work
equally well on MNIST.
5.3 CELEBA
The CelebA dataset consists of more than 200,000 cropped faces of celebrities, each annotated
with 40 different attributes. For our experiments, we further scale the images to 64x64 and ignore
the attribute annotations. VAE-GAN reconstructions of original images after training are shown in
Figure 19 in the Appendix.
Since faces don’t have natural classes, we only evaluated the latent and LVAE attacks. We tried
lambdas ranging from 0.1 to 0.75 for both attacks. Figure 20 shows adversarial examples generated
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MNIST SVHN
Method MeanL2 Mean RMSD Time to attack MeanL2 Mean RMSD Time to attack
L2 Optimization Classifier Attack 3.36 0.120 277 1.77 0.032 274
L2 OptimizationLVAE Attack 3.68 0.131 734 2.36 0.043 895
L2 Optimization Latent Attack 2.96 0.105 236 2.80 0.051 242
Table 1: Comparison of mean L2 norm and RMSD between the original images and the generated
adversarial examples for the different attacks. Time to attack is the mean number of seconds it takes
to generate 1000 adversarial examples using the given attack method (with the same number of
optimization iterations for each attack).
using the latent attack and a lambda value of 0.5 (L2 norm between original images and generated
adversarial examples 9.78, RMSD 0.088) and the corresponding VAE-GAN reconstructions. Most
of the reconstructions reflect the target image very well. We get even better results with the LVAE
attack, using a lambda value of 0.75 (L2 norm between original images and generated adversarial
examples 8.98, RMSD 0.081) as shown in Figure 21.
Figure 7: Summary of different attacks on CelebA dataset: reconstructions of original images (top),
reconstructions of adversarial examples generated using the latent attack (middle) and LVAE attack
(bottom). Target reconstruction is shown on the right. Full results are in the Appendix.
5.4 SUMMARY OF DIFFERENT ATTACK METHODS
Table 1 shows a comparison of the mean distances between original images and generated adver-
sarial examples for the three different attack methods. The larger the distance between the original
image and the adversarial perturbation, the more noticeable the perturbation will tend to be, and the
more likely a human observer will no longer recognize the original input, so effective attacks keep
these distances small while still achieving their goal. The latent attack consistently gives the best
results in our experiments, and the classifier attack performs the worst.
We also measure the time it takes to generate 1000 adversarial examples using the given attack
method. The LVAE attack is by far the slowest of the three, due to the fact that it requires computing
full reconstructions at each step of the optimizer when generating the adversarial examples. The
other two attacks do not need to run the reconstruction step during optimization of the adversarial
examples.
6 CONCLUSION
We explored generating adversarial examples against generative models such as VAEs and VAE-
GANs. These models are also vulnerable to adversaries that convince them to turn inputs into
surprisingly different outputs. We have also motivated why an attacker might want to attack gen-
erative models. Our work adds further support to the hypothesis that adversarial examples are a
general phenomenon for current neural network architectures, given our successful application of
adversarial attacks to popular generative models. In this work, we are helping to lay the foundations
for understanding how to build more robust networks. Future work will explore defense and robusti-
fication in greater depth as well as attacks on generative models trained using natural image datasets
such as CIFAR-10 and ImageNet.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 MEAN LATENT VECTOR TARGETED ATTACK
A variant of the single latent vector targeted attack described in Section 4.3, that was not explored in
previous work to our knowledge is to take the mean latent vector of many target images and use that
vector as xt. This variant is more flexible, in that the attacker can choose different latent properties
to target without needing to find the ideal input. For example, in MNIST, the attacker may wish to
have a particular line thickness or slant in the reconstructed digit, but may not have such an image
available. In that case, by choosing some images of the target class with thinner lines or less slant,
and some with thicker lines or more slant, the attacker can find a target latent vector that closely
matches the desired properties.
In this case, the attack starts by using fenc to produce the target latent vector, zt, from the chosen
target images, x(t).
zt =
1
|x(t)|
|x(t)|∑
i=0
fenc(x
i
(t)). (8)
In this work, we choose to reconstruct “ideal” MNIST digits by taking the mean latent vector of all
of the training digits of each class, and using those vectors as xt. Given a target class yt, a set of
examples X and their corresponding ground truth labels y, we create a subset x(t) as follows:
x(t) = {xi|xi ∈ X ∧ yi = yt} . (9)
Both variants of this attack appear to be similarly effective, as shown in Figure 15 and Figure 5. The
trade-off between the two in these experiments is between the simplicity of the first attack and the
flexibility of the second attack.
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Figure 8: Variational autoencoder architecture.
A.2 EVALUATION RESULTS
Figure 9: Original Inputs and Reconstructions: The first 100 images from the validation set
reconstructed by the VAE (left) and the VAE-GAN (right).
Figure 10: Untargeted FGS LVAE Attack: VAE reconstructions (left) and VAE-GAN reconstruc-
tions (right). Note the difference in reconstructions compared to Figure 9. Careful visual inspection
reveals that none of the VAE reconstructions change class, and only two of the VAE-GAN recon-
structions change class (a 6 to a 0 in the next-to-last row, and a 9 to a 4 in the last row). Combining
FGS with LVAE does not seem to give an effective attack.
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Target 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Classifier accuracy 1.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Matching rate 95.06% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.89%
Table 2: L2 Optimization Classifier Attack on MNIST: fclass accuracy on adversarial examples
against the VAE-GAN for each target class (middle row) and the matching rate between the predic-
tions fclass made and the adversarial target class (bottom row). The adversarial examples success-
fully fool fclass into predicting the target class almost 100% of the time, which makes this attack
seem like a strong attack, but the attack actually fails to generate good reconstructions in many cases.
Reconstructions for target classes 0 and 4 can be seen in Figure 4 and Figure 11.
Source Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 Target 9
0 - 85.54%(34.94%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(13.25%)
75.90%
(75.90%)
96.39%
(92.77%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
96.39%
(91.57%)
0.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(83.13%)
1 100.00%(100.00%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(93.60%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(98.40%)
2 100.00%(100.00%)
97.37%
(55.26%) -
100.00%
(55.26%)
97.37%
(88.60%)
95.61%
(74.56%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
99.12%
(94.74%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(92.98%)
3 100.00%(100.00%)
90.65%
(89.72%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
100.00%
(91.59%)
94.39%
(94.39%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
85.05%
(84.11%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
90.65%
(88.79%)
4 100.00%(100.00%)
97.27%
(67.27%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(18.18%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
5 100.00%(100.00%)
96.55%
(80.46%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
2.30%
(2.30%)
100.00%
(96.55%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
98.85%
(89.66%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
95.40%
(94.25%)
6 100.00%(100.00%)
87.36%
(80.46%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(11.49%)
100.00%
(97.70%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
100.00%
(98.85%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(96.55%)
7 100.00%(100.00%)
90.91%
(82.83%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(16.16%)
100.00%
(79.80%)
100.00%
(98.99%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
8 100.00%(100.00%)
89.77%
(71.59%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(35.23%)
100.00%
(97.73%)
89.77%
(62.50%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
98.86%
(92.05%) -
98.86%
(96.59%)
9 100.00%(100.00%)
95.65%
(75.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(18.48%)
100.00%
(97.83%)
100.00%
(95.65%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(0.00%) -
Table 3: L2 Optimization Latent Attack on MNIST (single latent vector target):
ASignore−target (AStarget in parentheses) after one reconstruction loop for different source and
target class pairs on the VAE-GAN model. The latent representation of a random image from the
target class is used to generate the target latent vector. Higher values indicate more successful attacks
against the generative model.
Source Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 Target 9
0 - 40.96%(1.20%)
6.02%
(4.82%)
10.84%
(7.23%)
75.90%
(0.00%)
6.02%
(3.61%)
28.92%
(28.92%)
37.35%
(20.48%)
6.02%
(1.20%)
10.84%
(3.61%)
1 99.20%(77.60%) -
7.20%
(5.60%)
1.60%
(1.60%)
85.60%
(0.00%)
8.00%
(5.60%)
28.80%
(28.00%)
8.80%
(7.20%)
3.20%
(1.60%)
69.60%
(0.80%)
2 85.96%(80.70%)
3.51%
(2.63%) -
29.82%
(23.68%)
78.95%
(0.00%)
72.81%
(20.18%)
72.81%
(46.49%)
35.09%
(8.77%)
41.23%
(12.28%)
68.42%
(2.63%)
3 93.46%(83.18%)
26.17%
(12.15%)
27.10%
(16.82%) -
67.29%
(0.00%)
66.36%
(62.62%)
87.85%
(22.43%)
50.47%
(27.10%)
23.36%
(8.41%)
33.64%
(8.41%)
4 100.00%(82.73%)
70.00%
(48.18%)
28.18%
(10.91%)
84.55%
(17.27%) -
66.36%
(31.82%)
95.45%
(71.82%)
62.73%
(37.27%)
20.91%
(0.91%)
51.82%
(44.55%)
5 93.10%(89.66%)
21.84%
(1.15%)
68.97%
(11.49%)
28.74%
(18.39%)
3.45%
(0.00%) -
20.69%
(19.54%)
80.46%
(41.38%)
22.99%
(2.30%)
44.83%
(12.64%)
6 29.89%(28.74%)
44.83%
(1.15%)
24.14%
(3.45%)
59.77%
(11.49%)
77.01%
(0.00%)
10.34%
(8.05%) -
62.07%
(8.05%)
8.05%
(0.00%)
75.86%
(4.60%)
7 79.80%(65.66%)
77.78%
(26.26%)
20.20%
(8.08%)
8.08%
(4.04%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
56.57%
(23.23%)
97.98%
(17.17%) -
38.38%
(1.01%)
17.17%
(10.10%)
8 94.32%(84.09%)
96.59%
(18.18%)
60.23%
(42.05%)
57.95%
(43.18%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
93.18%
(80.68%)
100.00%
(57.95%)
100.00%
(34.09%) -
87.50%
(26.14%)
9 98.91%(79.35%)
97.83%
(33.70%)
26.09%
(1.09%)
17.39%
(2.17%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
22.83%
(21.74%)
100.00%
(30.43%)
47.83%
(43.48%)
31.52%
(4.35%) -
Table 4: L2 Optimization Classifier Attack on MNIST: ASignore−target (AStarget in parenthe-
ses) for all source and target class pairs using adversarial examples generated on the VAE-GAN
model. Higher values indicate more successful attacks against the generative model.
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Figure 11: L2 Optimization Classifier Attack: Reconstructions of the first 100 adversarial exam-
ples targeting 4, demonstrating why the AStarget metric is 0 for all source digits.
Source Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 Target 9
0 - 90.36%(14.46%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(98.80%)
100.00%
(61.45%)
91.57%
(90.36%)
100.00%
(96.39%)
68.67%
(50.60%)
100.00%
(91.57%)
98.80%
(37.35%)
1 100.00%(100.00%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(99.20%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(97.60%)
100.00%
(96.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(96.00%)
2 100.00%(100.00%)
84.21%
(60.53%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
90.35%
(71.93%)
100.00%
(85.96%)
88.60%
(88.60%)
97.37%
(76.32%)
94.74%
(94.74%)
97.37%
(35.09%)
3 100.00%(100.00%)
75.70%
(66.36%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
94.39%
(52.34%)
99.07%
(99.07%)
98.13%
(82.24%)
64.49%
(53.27%)
100.00%
(96.26%)
67.29%
(31.78%)
4 100.00%(100.00%)
100.00%
(52.73%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
100.00%
(97.27%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(99.09%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
85.45%
(83.64%)
5 100.00%(100.00%)
96.55%
(40.23%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
93.10%
(59.77%) -
100.00%
(95.40%)
93.10%
(71.26%)
96.55%
(96.55%)
83.91%
(51.72%)
6 100.00%(100.00%)
97.70%
(70.11%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(91.95%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
97.70%
(67.82%)
100.00%
(98.85%)
95.40%
(50.57%)
7 100.00%(100.00%)
85.86%
(58.59%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(98.99%)
100.00%
(97.98%)
100.00%
(79.80%) -
100.00%
(98.99%)
100.00%
(96.97%)
8 100.00%(100.00%)
69.32%
(44.32%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
54.55%
(53.41%)
96.59%
(96.59%)
95.45%
(92.05%)
73.86%
(52.27%) -
42.05%
(29.55%)
9 100.00%(100.00%)
100.00%
(44.57%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
96.74%
(95.65%)
100.00%
(97.83%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(97.83%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
Table 5: L2 Optimization LVAE Attack on MNIST (single image target): ASignore−target
(AStarget in parentheses) for different source and target class pairs using adversarial examples
generated on the VAE-GAN model. Higher values indicate more successful attacks against the
generative model.
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Figure 12: Untargeted FGS Classifer Attack: Adversarial examples (left) and their reconstruc-
tions by the generative model (right) for the first 100 images from the MNIST validation set. Top
results are for VAE, while bottom results are for VAE-GAN. Note the difference in quality of the
reconstructed adversarial examples.
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Figure 13: Original images with random noise added (top) and their reconstructions by VAE (bottom
left) and VAE-GAN (bottom right). The magnitude of the random noise is the same as for the
generated adversarial noise shown in Figure 12. Random noise does not cause the reconstructed
images to change in a significant way.
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Source Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 Target 9
0 - 85.54%(34.94%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(13.25%)
75.90%
(75.90%)
96.39%
(92.77%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
96.39%
(91.57%)
0.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(83.13%)
1 100.00%(100.00%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(93.60%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(98.40%)
2 100.00%(100.00%)
97.37%
(55.26%) -
100.00%
(55.26%)
97.37%
(88.60%)
95.61%
(74.56%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
99.12%
(94.74%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(92.98%)
3 100.00%(100.00%)
90.65%
(89.72%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
100.00%
(91.59%)
94.39%
(94.39%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
85.05%
(84.11%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
90.65%
(88.79%)
4 100.00%(100.00%)
97.27%
(67.27%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(18.18%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
5 100.00%(100.00%)
96.55%
(80.46%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
2.30%
(2.30%)
100.00%
(96.55%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
98.85%
(89.66%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
95.40%
(94.25%)
6 100.00%(100.00%)
87.36%
(80.46%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(11.49%)
100.00%
(97.70%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
100.00%
(98.85%)
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(96.55%)
7 100.00%(100.00%)
90.91%
(82.83%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(16.16%)
100.00%
(79.80%)
100.00%
(98.99%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
100.00%
(0.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
8 100.00%(100.00%)
89.77%
(71.59%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(35.23%)
100.00%
(97.73%)
89.77%
(62.50%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
98.86%
(92.05%) -
98.86%
(96.59%)
9 100.00%(100.00%)
95.65%
(75.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(18.48%)
100.00%
(97.83%)
100.00%
(95.65%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(0.00%) -
Table 6: L2 Optimization LVAE Attack (mean reconstruction target): ASignore−target
(AStarget in parentheses) for all source and target class pairs using adversarial examples gener-
ated on the VAE-GAN model. The mean reconstruction image for each target class (over all of the
images of that class in the training set) is used as the target reconstruction. Higher values indicate
more successful attacks against the generative model.
Source Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 Target 9
0 - 40.96%(10.84%)
65.06%
(65.06%)
53.01%
(46.99%)
62.65%
(54.22%)
36.14%
(36.14%)
59.04%
(59.04%)
46.99%
(46.99%)
13.25%
(12.05%)
44.58%
(27.71%)
1 100.00%(100.00%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(96.80%)
2 96.49%(96.49%)
60.53%
(59.65%) -
95.61%
(95.61%)
78.07%
(75.44%)
98.25%
(71.05%)
94.74%
(90.35%)
71.05%
(69.30%)
52.63%
(50.88%)
75.44%
(42.98%)
3 100.00%(100.00%)
87.85%
(66.36%)
90.65%
(90.65%) -
85.98%
(73.83%)
95.33%
(95.33%)
79.44%
(53.27%)
65.42%
(64.49%)
59.81%
(46.73%)
70.09%
(58.88%)
4 99.09%(99.09%)
67.27%
(66.36%)
96.36%
(96.36%)
100.00%
(81.82%) -
100.00%
(98.18%)
93.64%
(93.64%)
98.18%
(95.45%)
97.27%
(92.73%)
39.09%
(39.09%)
5 100.00%(100.00%)
79.31%
(51.72%)
100.00%
(83.91%)
70.11%
(70.11%)
80.46%
(72.41%) -
73.56%
(73.56%)
87.36%
(73.56%)
55.17%
(52.87%)
75.86%
(65.52%)
6 97.70%(97.70%)
68.97%
(50.57%)
96.55%
(96.55%)
95.40%
(71.26%)
73.56%
(73.56%)
87.36%
(77.01%) -
88.51%
(72.41%)
90.80%
(55.17%)
91.95%
(35.63%)
7 100.00%(97.98%)
83.84%
(83.84%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
93.94%
(90.91%)
98.99%
(96.97%)
88.89%
(81.82%) -
100.00%
(86.87%)
50.51%
(50.51%)
8 100.00%(100.00%)
96.59%
(78.41%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
98.86%
(95.45%)
94.32%
(86.36%)
98.86%
(98.86%)
98.86%
(93.18%)
98.86%
(73.86%) -
87.50%
(78.41%)
9 100.00%(100.00%)
100.00%
(76.09%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
98.91%
(96.74%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(98.91%)
97.83%
(97.83%)
98.91%
(98.91%)
97.83%
(94.57%) -
Table 7: L2 Optimization Latent Attack (mean latent vector target): ASignore−target (AStarget
in parentheses) for all source and target class pairs using adversarial examples generated on the
VAE-GAN model. The mean latent vector for each target class (over all of the images of that class
in the training set) is used as the target latent vector. Higher values indicate more successful attacks
against the generative model.
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Figure 14: L2 Optimization Latent Attack (mean latent vector targets): VAE-GAN reconstruc-
tions of adversarial examples with target classes from 1 through 9. Original examples which already
belong to the target class are excluded.
Source Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 Target 9
0 - 95.18%(9.64%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
98.80%
(93.98%)
100.00%
(48.19%)
91.57%
(89.16%)
100.00%
(89.16%)
73.49%
(43.37%)
100.00%
(87.95%)
100.00%
(25.30%)
1 100.00%(100.00%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(92.80%)
100.00%
(97.60%)
100.00%
(98.40%)
100.00%
(76.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(90.40%)
2 98.25%(98.25%)
83.33%
(48.25%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
88.60%
(43.86%)
99.12%
(63.16%)
74.56%
(71.93%)
99.12%
(63.16%)
93.86%
(92.98%)
99.12%
(21.05%)
3 99.07%(98.13%)
57.01%
(42.99%)
99.07%
(99.07%) -
82.24%
(36.45%)
89.72%
(88.79%)
99.07%
(61.68%)
57.01%
(37.38%)
98.13%
(92.52%)
67.29%
(18.69%)
4 100.00%(100.00%)
100.00%
(37.27%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(99.09%) -
100.00%
(80.00%)
98.18%
(93.64%)
100.00%
(94.55%)
100.00%
(99.09%)
86.36%
(80.00%)
5 100.00%(100.00%)
97.70%
(19.54%)
100.00%
(98.85%)
98.85%
(98.85%)
85.06%
(44.83%) -
95.40%
(88.51%)
93.10%
(45.98%)
96.55%
(96.55%)
87.36%
(34.48%)
6 100.00%(100.00%)
96.55%
(58.62%)
100.00%
(98.85%)
100.00%
(98.85%)
100.00%
(86.21%)
100.00%
(97.70%) -
100.00%
(56.32%)
100.00%
(96.55%)
95.40%
(43.68%)
7 100.00%(100.00%)
80.81%
(40.40%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(98.99%)
100.00%
(92.93%)
100.00%
(87.88%)
100.00%
(62.63%) -
100.00%
(97.98%)
100.00%
(88.89%)
8 100.00%(100.00%)
44.32%
(18.18%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
30.68%
(28.41%)
78.41%
(76.14%)
89.77%
(81.82%)
75.00%
(38.64%) -
22.73%
(15.91%)
9 100.00%(100.00%)
98.91%
(17.39%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
97.83%
(92.39%)
100.00%
(89.13%)
100.00%
(92.39%)
98.91%
(94.57%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
Table 8: L2 Optimization LVAE Attack (mean reconstruction target): ASignore−target
(AStarget in parentheses) for all source and target class pairs using adversarial examples gener-
ated on the VAE-GAN model. The mean image for each target class (over all of the images of that
class in the training set) is used as the target. Higher values indicate more successful attacks against
the generative model.
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Figure 15: L2 Optimization Latent Attack (single latent vector target): VAE-GAN reconstruc-
tions of adversarial examples generated using the latent attack with target classes 0 and 7 using two
random targets in latent space per target class. Original examples which already belong to the target
class are excluded. The stylistic differences in the reconstructions are clearly visible.
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Figure 16: L2 Optimization Latent Attack (single latent vector target): t-SNE plot of the latent
space, with the addition of green circles representing the adversarial examples for target class 0. In
this plot, it appears that the adversarial examples cluster around 6 (yellow) and 0 (red).
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Source Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 Target 9
0 - 92.77%(38.55%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(66.27%)
100.00%
(34.94%)
100.00%
(22.89%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
79.52%
(63.86%)
97.59%
(90.36%)
100.00%
(62.65%)
1 100.00%(100.00%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(99.20%)
100.00%
(90.40%)
100.00%
(0.80%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
2 97.37%(97.37%)
97.37%
(57.02%) -
100.00%
(87.72%)
98.25%
(42.11%)
100.00%
(50.88%)
100.00%
(99.12%)
97.37%
(89.47%)
89.47%
(89.47%)
100.00%
(81.58%)
3 100.00%(100.00%)
89.72%
(85.05%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
62.62%
(48.60%)
91.59%
(45.79%)
100.00%
(99.07%)
95.33%
(90.65%)
97.20%
(94.39%)
90.65%
(79.44%)
4 100.00%(100.00%)
95.45%
(67.27%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(73.64%) -
100.00%
(30.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(99.09%)
100.00%
(99.09%)
99.09%
(99.09%)
5 100.00%(100.00%)
98.85%
(79.31%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
73.56%
(73.56%)
83.91%
(34.48%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
90.80%
(87.36%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
87.36%
(82.76%)
6 100.00%(100.00%)
86.21%
(79.31%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(88.51%)
95.40%
(71.26%)
10.34%
(10.34%) -
100.00%
(83.91%)
100.00%
(97.70%)
100.00%
(70.11%)
7 100.00%(100.00%)
91.92%
(79.80%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(87.88%)
100.00%
(63.64%)
100.00%
(58.59%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
8 100.00%(100.00%)
88.64%
(73.86%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(46.59%)
95.45%
(44.32%)
96.59%
(31.82%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
96.59%
(94.32%) -
95.45%
(79.55%)
9 100.00%(100.00%)
96.74%
(72.83%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
100.00%
(59.78%)
66.30%
(63.04%)
100.00%
(28.26%)
100.00%
(100.00%)
98.91%
(98.91%)
100.00%
(100.00%) -
Table 9: L2 Optimization LVAE Attack on MNIST (single image target): ASignore−target
(AStarget in parentheses) for different source and target class pairs using adversarial examples
generated on the VAE-GAN model. Higher values indicate more successful attacks against the
generative model.
Figure 17: Original Inputs and Reconstructions: The first 100 images from the SVHN validation
set (left) reconstructed by VAE-GAN (right).
Source Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 Target 9
0 - 64.29%(40.00%)
78.57%
(61.43%)
92.86%
(80.00%)
84.29%
(57.14%)
98.57%
(98.57%)
94.29%
(38.57%)
88.57%
(54.29%)
95.71%
(11.43%)
95.71%
(25.71%)
1 76.80%(70.72%) -
74.59%
(67.40%)
93.37%
(88.95%)
75.69%
(65.19%)
98.34%
(97.79%)
86.74%
(24.86%)
46.96%
(36.46%)
96.13%
(4.97%)
96.13%
(28.73%)
2 82.93%(65.85%)
57.93%
(42.68%) -
90.24%
(86.59%)
53.66%
(46.34%)
99.39%
(98.17%)
82.93%
(14.02%)
71.34%
(57.32%)
71.34%
(6.71%)
24.39%
(23.17%)
3 92.17%(64.35%)
58.26%
(41.74%)
83.48%
(68.70%) -
84.35%
(49.57%)
96.52%
(95.65%)
53.91%
(23.48%)
90.43%
(56.52%)
93.04%
(5.22%)
93.91%
(33.91%)
4 74.44%(55.56%)
47.78%
(43.33%)
70.00%
(61.11%)
86.67%
(77.78%) -
100.00%
(98.89%)
93.33%
(35.56%)
90.00%
(36.67%)
85.56%
(14.44%)
94.44%
(27.78%)
5 75.31%(50.62%)
59.26%
(43.21%)
88.89%
(58.02%)
97.53%
(88.89%)
72.84%
(53.09%) -
37.04%
(18.52%)
80.25%
(41.98%)
32.10%
(6.17%)
92.59%
(30.86%)
6 67.44%(47.67%)
56.98%
(27.91%)
84.88%
(55.81%)
86.05%
(79.07%)
65.12%
(39.53%)
94.19%
(94.19%) -
90.70%
(33.72%)
58.14%
(10.47%)
87.21%
(22.09%)
7 87.34%(63.29%)
55.70%
(48.10%)
79.75%
(74.68%)
92.41%
(79.75%)
69.62%
(41.77%)
97.47%
(89.87%)
93.67%
(18.99%) -
91.14%
(7.59%)
97.47%
(17.72%)
8 98.33%(63.33%)
78.33%
(38.33%)
80.00%
(63.33%)
100.00%
(88.33%)
93.33%
(48.33%)
98.33%
(96.67%)
96.67%
(35.00%)
96.67%
(50.00%) -
95.00%
(31.67%)
9 87.88%(66.67%)
72.73%
(43.94%)
92.42%
(80.30%)
93.94%
(86.36%)
80.30%
(51.52%)
95.45%
(93.94%)
98.48%
(27.27%)
92.42%
(62.12%)
93.94%
(9.09%) -
Table 10: L2 Optimization Latent Attack on SVHN (single latent vector target):
ASignore−target (AStarget in parentheses) after one reconstruction loop for different source and
target class pairs on the VAE-GAN model. The latent representation of a random image from the
target class is used to generate the target latent vector. Higher values indicate more successful attacks
against the generative model.
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Source Target 0 Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 Target 9
0 - 30.00%(12.86%)
32.86%
(5.71%)
34.29%
(5.71%)
28.57%
(0.00%)
30.00%
(1.43%)
30.00%
(5.71%)
30.00%
(0.00%)
30.00%
(1.43%)
31.43%
(0.00%)
1 13.26%(1.10%) -
7.73%
(1.66%)
18.78%
(4.97%)
13.26%
(3.31%)
12.15%
(0.00%)
11.60%
(0.55%)
9.94%
(1.10%)
10.50%
(1.10%)
16.02%
(0.55%)
2 23.17%(0.61%)
13.41%
(3.66%) -
17.07%
(3.05%)
14.63%
(1.83%)
14.63%
(2.44%)
15.24%
(0.00%)
15.24%
(1.22%)
14.02%
(0.61%)
15.24%
(1.22%)
3 30.43%(0.87%)
26.09%
(7.83%)
30.43%
(2.61%) -
30.43%
(0.00%)
29.57%
(6.96%)
27.83%
(0.00%)
27.83%
(1.74%)
28.70%
(2.61%)
33.91%
(6.09%)
4 21.11%(0.00%)
15.56%
(5.56%)
16.67%
(2.22%)
25.56%
(4.44%) -
16.67%
(1.11%)
18.89%
(0.00%)
16.67%
(1.11%)
18.89%
(2.22%)
22.22%
(0.00%)
5 32.10%(0.00%)
28.40%
(3.70%)
27.16%
(3.70%)
32.10%
(8.64%)
24.69%
(2.47%) -
28.40%
(6.17%)
23.46%
(0.00%)
27.16%
(3.70%)
27.16%
(0.00%)
6 27.91%(4.65%)
25.58%
(4.65%)
26.74%
(0.00%)
33.72%
(3.49%)
30.23%
(2.33%)
20.93%
(4.65%) -
31.40%
(0.00%)
24.42%
(3.49%)
32.56%
(0.00%)
7 30.38%(0.00%)
27.85%
(12.66%)
26.58%
(10.13%)
31.65%
(5.06%)
31.65%
(0.00%)
30.38%
(0.00%)
32.91%
(0.00%) -
30.38%
(0.00%)
34.18%
(1.27%)
8 40.00%(5.00%)
35.00%
(0.00%)
33.33%
(3.33%)
43.33%
(6.67%)
40.00%
(3.33%)
35.00%
(1.67%)
41.67%
(11.67%)
38.33%
(0.00%) -
36.67%
(0.00%)
9 34.85%(6.06%)
33.33%
(12.12%)
33.33%
(9.09%)
40.91%
(4.55%)
31.82%
(3.03%)
31.82%
(0.00%)
33.33%
(0.00%)
34.85%
(0.00%)
31.82%
(1.52%) -
Table 11: L2 Optimization LVAE Attack on SVHN (single image target): ASignore−target
(AStarget in parentheses) after one reconstruction loop for different source and target class pairs
on the VAE-GAN model. The latent representation of a random image from the target class is
used to generate the target latent vector. Higher values indicate more successful attacks against the
generative model.
Figure 18: L2 Optimization Latent Attack (single latent vector target): Nearest neighbors in
latent space for generated adversarial examples (target class 0) on the first 100 images from the
MNIST (left) and SVHN (right) validation sets.
Figure 19: Original images in the CelebA dataset (left) and their VAE-GAN reconstructions (right).
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Figure 20: L2 Optimization Latent Attack on CelebA Dataset (single latent vector target):
Adversarial examples generated for 100 images from the CelebA dataset (left) and their VAE-GAN
reconstructions (right).
Figure 21: L2 Optimization LVAE Attack on CelebA Dataset (single image target): Adversarial
examples generated for 100 images from the CelebA dataset (left) and their VAE-GAN reconstruc-
tions (right).
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Orig Mean 1 Smp 12 Smp 50 Smp L2 Adv Mean 1 Smp 12 Smp 50 Smp
Figure 22: Effect of sampling on adversarial reconstructions. Columns in order: original image,
reconstruction of the original image (no sampling, just the mean), reconstruction of the original
image (1 sample), reconstruction of the original image (12 samples), reconstruction of the original
image (50 samples), adversarial example (latent attack), reconstruction of the adversarial example
(no sampling, just the mean), reconstruction of the adversarial example (1 sample), reconstruction
of the adversarial example (12 samples), reconstruction of the adversarial example (50 samples).
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